What Is a Legal Understanding
Sometimes I like to think of ideology as a kind of „cultural software“ – a set of tools for understanding the social world, a copy of which is distributed to each of us. Our individual subjectivity occupies and is constituted by this cultural software. If our copies are roughly similar—if we have internalized roughly the same cultural frameworks of understanding—then each subject`s contributions to the object of understanding will also be roughly similar. In this way, a shared subjectivity creates a common objectivity. Thus, when I speak of the „juridical subject“ or the contributions of „subjectivity“, I am referring to two complementary ideas: on the one hand, the contribution of the individual through the act of understanding to his experience of the social world, and on the other hand, the social construction of the individual, which helps to shape the forms and limits of his understanding. A subject jurisprudence is above all a cultural jurisprudence, because it is culture that creates legal subjects as subjects. The coherence of the world around us is special. This may involve judgments about logical, narrative, and normative coherence, but this is of a completely different order. The coherence of the world around us is required by our existence as understanding beings. It is not, therefore, simply a characteristic of a particular set of beliefs; This is a characteristic of our beliefs.
This is a goal of the understanding activity, a global task in which we always participate. An action brought by a plaintiff against a defendant based on a claim that the defendant failed to comply with a legal obligation that caused harm to the plaintiff. Stricter requirements for normative consistency are possible. For example, Joseph Raz suggested that coherence requires unity of principles, so that the legal system would be more coherent if we could imagine it from a single principle. (20) This is a very strong need for consistency which is not found in any substantial part of the law. Another view, also proposed by Raz, would require the interdependence of principles and policies of justification. Just as our beliefs sometimes support each other, the legal system would be coherent if it could be justified by a set of interdependent principles and policies that stand together or coincide. (21) Although this requirement is lower than the first one, it is still too stringent. It would be remarkable if the many different principles, policies and objectives underlying the legislation were maintained or agreed. The justifications underlying the law are less interdependent than competent; We hope that the coherent legal system will be that the law will apply and arbitrate it in a consistent and principled manner. In my opinion, the relative lack of interest in the legal subject in the usual jurisprudential accounts is in itself a sociological phenomenon that deserves to be examined.
Its main ideological characteristic is projection: the attribution of self-traits to the objects of understanding. (5) When discussions in case law neglect what the legal entity contributes to the object of interpretation, they project the contribution of the subject matter onto the subject matter and thus manifest that contribution as a characteristic or property of the right. 6) What is coherence in the context of a legal order? I would argue that legal coherence as the property of a legal object is a kind of normative coherence. This is not a feature of existing legislation and legal documents, but justifications we can offer for it. (18) Legal coherence is therefore the normative consistency of the legal justification. The law (or part of the law) is consistent when the principles, guidelines and objectives that might justify it form a coherent whole, meaning that all conflicts between them are resolved in a principled, reasonable and non-arbitrary manner. (19) Legal, legal, lawful, lawful means. Licite may apply to conformity with laws of any kind (e.g., natural, divine, general, or canonical). The legal sovereign right applies to what is sanctioned by law or in accordance with the law, especially if it is written or administered by the courts. Legal residents of the state may legitimately refer to a legal right or status, but also, in the case of extensive use, to a right or status supported by tradition, custom or accepted norms. A perfectly legitimate question about tax legality concerns strict compliance with legal provisions and applies in particular to what is regulated by law. Legal Drug Use by Physicians,28 Consider the following two principles from a discussion of tort law in Dworkin`s Law Empire: (1) „No one has a moral right to compensation except bodily harm“ and (2) „People have a moral right to compensation for emotional harm suffered at the scene of an accident against any person, whose negligence caused the accident, but are not entitled to compensation for the emotional damage subsequently suffered.
Dworkin, op. cit. cit., note 8, p. 240. Dworkin easily rejects the former as a principle of justification because it does not correspond to existing jurisprudence. Id., p. 242. However, he rejects the latter on the grounds that it „does not establish any principle of justice“. With respect to our previous discussion, Dworkin says that the second statement cannot be used as a principle for hypothetical justification purposes. A system of norms that included it would fail the test of hypothetical justification and would not establish the coherence of the legal system.