Rules of Ratio Decidendi

Finding examples of ratio decidendi in a case is one of the most difficult things a lawyer can face when referring to precedents when writing a legal brief. Here are some ways lawyers can better establish examples of ratio decidendi in a case: Obita dicta carry different weights. On the light side, there are simple fleeting remarks, and on the heavy side, there are statements that have been fully argued as if it were the ratio. [42] In the case of overtime, the dispute clarifies the degree of universality of the relationship in question. [11] For example, a ratio applied 1,000 times has a clearer picture than a ratio applied 1 time. The relationship is increasingly cemented by reformulations in later cases and comments. [12] Unexpressed assumptions do not form the relationship. In Muldoon v Church of England Children`s Homes Burwood, 2011, NSWCA Campbell wrote YES to [39]: To form the relationship, the majority of judges must agree if there are multiple judges. [29] Dissenting judgments are not implicitly binding.

“Dissenting judgments” are judgments of the minority of judges, for example 2 judges out of 6. If the facts are the same, judgments may bind the lower courts even if there was no proportion, provided that the facts are similar. The book Laying Down the Law made this point well: “If the essential facts are the same, the lower court will always have to come to the same conclusion by applying the same legal standards as the higher court, even if the law would not have been challenged in that particular decision of the higher court.” [36] In all cases, there is no ratio decidendi. In Perara-Cathcart v. The Queen [2017] HCA, Justice Gageler stated: An example of a ratio decidendi is Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932), also known as the “snail in the bottle box.” This case is a good example of a ratio decidendi because it explores the idea that a person owes another person a duty of care that they can reasonably foresee will be affected as a result of their actions. According to Farah, most courts feel compelled to follow seriously considered dicta, and courts that do not are now the outliers. [45] For example, Spigelman J.

wrote in Zotti v. Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd (2009) NSWCA: “This tribunal is obliged to . the clearly formulated judgment of the High Court, even if it is not part of the ratio decidendi. In Lassanah v State of New South Wales [2009] NSWDC at [25], Gibson DCJ stated: “If this [passage] is not part of the ratio decidendi but amounts to an `obiter dicta considered`, I am still bound by this decision for the reasons explained by the High Court in Farah.” In Net Parts International Pty Ltd v Kenoss Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA, at p. [28], MacFarlan JA: The common law term “ratio decidendi” refers in Latin to the “reason for decision” or rule of a case. Each decision rendered by an appellate court governs future decisions of trial courts. In other words, the lower courts must respect the rules specified by the Court of Appeal in its written decisions. If the lower court is faced with a particular situation or dispute, it will be guided by the opinions of the Court of Appeal, which deal with similar situations. [75] The decision rule applied to the decision of a multidisciplinary tribunal in a case involving disagreement between its members differs in time, concept and purpose from the principle used to extract a ratio decidendi from the reasoning of the members of that tribunal in that case. The decision rule is applied at the time of the decision. The rule is intended to ensure a way out in the case. If it is triggered by a disagreement, the rule applies to get a result.

The principle is applied retrospectively and retrospectively. The principle is aligned with the ideal of ensuring that cases are decided consistently over time. This principle cannot always be expected to achieve this ideal. Each case must have an outcome, but not all cases should have a ratio decidendi. So, if we are talking about a legal case on which a similar case has already been decided, would that first case or precedent become the ratio decidendi of that case? Some jurists have debated whether jurisprudential thinking works by deductive logic, inductive logic, or analogy. In my opinion, deductive logic was excluded by Professor Julius Stone`s paper, in which he showed that we cannot deductively switch from descriptive relationship to prescriptive ratio (see section “PRESCRIPTIVE RATIO”). What remains is inductive logic and analogy. Inductive arguments, such as those used by the scientific method, such as a number of probabilistic methods,[13] are not really used in legal argumentation.

Therefore, in my opinion, the precedents use instead a crude form of inductive logic, that is, analogy.